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Returns to the problem of working out the framework of posing the questions that a theory of knowledge is supposed to answer and the status of scepticism in such a project. Stroud argues that owing to the generality of the question and the limitations we conceptually impose on what counts as human knowledge, no satisfactory answer to the question, posed in the right way, is or could be possible. Turning to counter‐arguments against his argument, Stroud discusses externalist strategies, which are found equally unsatisfactory.
Keywords: conceptual limitations; externalism; knowledge; scepticism
Chapter. 10106 words.
Subjects: Metaphysics
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