Chapter

Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability

Barry Stroud

in Understanding Human Knowledge

Published in print July 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252138
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598500 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252130.003.0011
 Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability

Show Summary Details

Preview

Stroud reviews the problem of transcendental arguments in general and develops Peter Strawson's account of such arguments. Stroud attempts to make a case for ‘invulnerability’, an epistemological status our beliefs might have, which on the one hand disarms scepticism and on the other does not go as far as pretending to lift our beliefs into the realm of knowledge of the external world. Strawson has previously doubted that even such a status can be given to our beliefs; in response Stroud, while maintaining a respectful sympathy with Strawson's stance, argues that this conclusion might have been arrived at too hastily and explores possibilities for which invulnerability can be ascribed to some of our beliefs.

Keywords: beliefs; conceptual capacities; epistemological status; invulnerability; Kant; knowledge of the external world; scepticism; Peter Strawson; transcendental arguments

Chapter.  9318 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.