Chapter

Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity

Barry Stroud

in Meaning, Understanding, and Practice

Published in print July 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252145
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598487 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252149.003.0001
 Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity

Show Summary Details

Preview

Disputes the attribution to Wittgenstein of a ‘conventionalist’ account of necessity. Conventionalism can seem appropriate given Wittgenstein's denial that there is anything in a person's understanding of the premises and rules he or she accepts, which can ‘force’ him or her to accept a particular conclusion. This conventionalist interpretation (ascribed to Michael Dummett) is resisted.

Keywords: conventionalism; Dummett; logical necessity; Wittgenstein

Chapter.  7045 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.