Actions as Inner Causes

Paul M. Pietroski

in Causing Actions

Published in print June 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252763
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598234 | DOI:
Actions as Inner Causes

Show Summary Details


Actions are mental events (tryings, volitions) that typically cause bodily motions. This is strongly suggested by the semantics of causative constructions, like ‘She raised her hand’, which require event analyses (and appeal to thematic roles). Objections to this view can be rebutted, while a range of intuitions about the individuation of actions are preserved, given the right conception of actions and action sentences.

Keywords: actions; causation; causatives; causes; event analysis; events; individuation; thematic roles; tryings; volition

Chapter.  16911 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.