Chapter

Fregean Innocence

Paul M. Pietroski

in Causing Actions

Published in print June 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252763
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598234 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252769.003.0003
Fregean Innocence

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In a belief ascription like ‘Sam believes that Hesperus rises in the evening’, the complementizer ‘that’ is a device for referring to the sense of the embedded sentence. On this Fregean view, substitutivity of co‐referential terms need not preserve truth. This accounts for the opacity of propositional attitude ascriptions, while preserving what Davidson called semantic innocence.

Keywords: belief ascription; Davidson; Frege; opacity; propositional attitudes; semantic innocence; semantics; sense; substitutivity

Chapter.  14205 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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