Chapter

From Explanation to Causation

Paul M. Pietroski

in Causing Actions

Published in print June 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252763
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598234 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252769.003.0004
From Explanation to Causation

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Causation is (primarily) a description‐insensitive relation between events, while explanation is a description‐sensitive relation between facts, which (for these purposes) can be identified with true Fregean thoughts. Events are thus individuated more coarsely than facts, which are the senses of true sentences. But given the event analysis defended in Ch. 1, some facts are about particular events. And if a fact about one event explains a fact about another event, then the first event is a cause for the second.

Keywords: causation; Davidson; events; explanation; facts; Frege; individuation; thoughts

Chapter.  13508 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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