Chapter

Natural Causes

Paul M. Pietroski

in Causing Actions

Published in print June 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252763
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598234 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252769.003.0008
Natural Causes

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The proposed account of causation, in terms of explanation, does not sleight the mind‐independence of causal relations. The relevant notion of explanation is objective, even if facts are taken to be abstract Fregean ‘modes of presenting’ (or ‘ways of thinking about’) events. Causation remains a natural, and often perceptible relation between spatiotemporal particulars. But we must resist empiricist conceptions of causation.

Keywords: causation; empiricism; events; explanation; facts; Frege; mind‐dependence; mode of presentation; objectivity; Strawson

Chapter.  14224 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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