Chapter

Moral Arguments*

Philippa Foot

in Virtues and Vices

Published in print October 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252862
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597435 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252866.003.0007
Moral Arguments*

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Hare, Stevenson, and others have asserted that moral arguments ‘may always break down’ in a way in which other arguments do not. This is because moral arguments must end with the assertion of a moral principle that may simply be denied. This view is flawed by its reliance on the idea that there is no logical connexion between facts and values. Emotivism and naturalism and their divergent approaches to moral arguments are examined.

Keywords: emotivism; moral judgements; naturalism; principles; values

Chapter.  5851 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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