Chapter

Moral Beliefs*

Philippa Foot

in Virtues and Vices

Published in print October 2002 | ISBN: 9780199252862
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597435 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252866.003.0008
Moral Beliefs*

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This essay looks critically at the arguments by which moral philosophers have rejected ethical naturalism. The author denies the supposed logical gap between assertions of fact and moral evaluations, arguing that there is an internal logical relation between the two. The word ‘good’ no more ‘floats free’ than does, e.g., ‘dangerous’. Both have a connexion in meaning with particular facts, and through them with reasons for action.

Keywords: belief; good; justice; naturalism; Plato; The Republic; virtues

Chapter.  9134 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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