Chapter

As I Believe

Jonathan Dancy

in Practical Reality

Published in print August 2002 | ISBN: 9780199253050
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597282 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199253056.003.0006
As I Believe

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Considers and rejects the view that motivating reasons are best specified in psychological form (S's reason was that he believed that . . .) rather than in non‐psychological form (S's reason was that . . .). Asks how we should then explain the fact that, if S acts for the reason that p, S must believe that p. It also asks whether the fact that the agent can be mistaken forces us to prefer the psychological form of explanation. It is argued that it does not, because explanation in terms of reasons is not factive; we explain S's action by appeal to what he believed even when he is wrong.

Keywords: enabling conditions; factive explanation; motivating reasons

Chapter.  7602 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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