Chapter

How Many Explanations?

Jonathan Dancy

in Practical Reality

Published in print August 2002 | ISBN: 9780199253050
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597282 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199253056.003.0008
How Many Explanations?

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Considers the idea that, in addition to the ‘normative’ explanation of action as characterized in this book, there might not also be causal explanations that appeal to psychological states of the agent as causes. Argues that such causal explanations cannot be accounts of the reasons for which the agent acted; we cannot have two such accounts in play at once. But, if they are merely causal, they are no longer attractive. Ends by considering the possibility of other causal explanations of action and their relation to normative explanations.

Keywords: action; causal explanation; causality; Donald Davidson; Kant; neurological explanation; normativity

Chapter.  8370 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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