Chapter

Oneness, Sameness, and Referential Opacity

Christopher Shields

in Order in Multiplicity

Published in print September 2002 | ISBN: 9780199253074
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598401 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199253072.003.0007

Series: Oxford Aristotle Studies

Oneness, Sameness, and Referential Opacity

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Shields examines oneness and sameness within the framework of homonymy developed in Part I. One of Shields's main aims here is to reject the reading according to which Aristotle introduces multiple entities when discussing accidental sameness. Shields argues that Aristotle does not countenance such entities, because the homonymy of oneness permits him to say that, e.g. Socrates and Socrates seated, are and are not one and the same. Oneness and sameness are core–dependent homonyms that gives Aristotle a means of recognizing how things can be one without being identical.

Keywords: accidental sameness; core–dependent homonyms identical; multiple entities; Oneness; Sameness

Chapter.  9522 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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