Chapter

Tales of the Two Treatises

Michael V. Wedin

in Aristotle's Theory of Substance

Published in print September 2002 | ISBN: 9780199253081
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598647 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199253080.003.0005

Series: Oxford Aristotle Studies

Tales of the Two Treatises

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Wedin considers the problem of the compatibility of the Categories account of primary substance with the theory of substantial form of the Metaphysics. Wedin collects from the secondary literature the most important arguments for incompatibilism, and offers some proposals for restoring their harmony. While admitting the evident differences in the way Aristotle treats the question of substance in each treatise, Wedin is keen to argue that these differences are not sufficient to conclude that the treatises are incompatible. Wedin singles out for particular attention, and criticism, Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig's account of Metaphysics Zeta, according to which the primary substance of the Metaphysics and the basic subject of predications is the form. Wedin considers two ‘philosophical’ arguments and one ‘Aristotelian’ argument for the subjecthood of forms, and argues that the textual evidence does not support the claim that form is the subject of accidents.

Keywords: compatibility; incompatibilism; Metaphysics Zeta; Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig; primary substance; subjecthood of forms; substantial form

Chapter.  15117 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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