Chapter

Internalism Defended

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman

in Evidentialism

Published in print April 2004 | ISBN: 9780199253722
Published online August 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191601361 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199253722.003.0004
Internalism Defended

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Endeavors to give a satisfactory account of the difference between internalist and externalist theories in epistemology. The internalist perspective, particularly in its evidentialist incarnations, is argued for and defended against recent objections. It is also suggested that epistemology is not best pursued by arguing about the boundaries of this division or arguing about the merits of everything on either side.

Keywords: deontology; evidence; externalism; Alvin Goldman; higher‐order beliefs; internalism; memory

Chapter.  13643 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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