The Ethics of Belief

Richard Feldman

in Evidentialism

Published in print April 2004 | ISBN: 9780199253722
Published online August 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191601361 | DOI:
The Ethics of Belief

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Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes that we epistemically ought to have. An evidentialist thesis about the attitudes we epistemically ought to have is supported.

Keywords: William Alston; doxastic voluntarism; epistemic duties; epistemic obligation; epistemic value; epistemology and ethics; ethics of belief; role ought

Chapter.  14080 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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