Chapter

Metaphysical Realism and the Unity of Truth

E. J. Lowe

in The Four-Category Ontology

Published in print December 2005 | ISBN: 9780199254392
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603600 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199254397.003.0011
 Metaphysical Realism and the Unity of Truth

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A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.

Keywords: D. M. Armstrong; metaphysical realism; principle of non-contradiction; propositions; relativism; states of affairs; truth; truth makers

Chapter.  7960 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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