Chapter

Truthmaking, Necessity, and Essential Dependence

E. J. Lowe

in The Four-Category Ontology

Published in print December 2005 | ISBN: 9780199254392
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603600 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199254397.003.0012
 Truthmaking, Necessity, and Essential Dependence

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The notion of truthmaking is examined. A distinction is drawn between formal ontological predicates — which should not be taken to denote elements of being — and other predicates, with ‘is true’, ‘exists’, and ‘is identical with’ belonging to the former class. Metaphysical realism is defended in the face of W. V. Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. Various species of metaphysical dependence are identified, and an account of truthmaking as a species of essential dependence is proposed and defended. It is explained how contingent truths are possible, given this account and the framework of the four-category ontology.

Keywords: categories; contingency; essential dependence; formal ontological predicates; metaphysical realism; W. V. Quine; truthmaking; truth

Chapter.  10686 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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