Chapter

Volitions

Berent Enç

in How We Act

Published in print August 2003 | ISBN: 9780199256020
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602238 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199256020.003.0002
Volitions

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This chapter is an attack on theories of action that have at their heart an appeal to original actions, that is, actions that we take in our capacity as full agents and that are irreducible to event causation. Such theories typically claim further that overt voluntary actions are caused or constituted by acts of volition and that such acts stand apart from an agent’s other acts in that they are what render the other acts voluntary. Enç develops a type of regress argument against such theories of original actions and subsequently introduces his own naturalistic and foundationalist conception of action as an alternative.

Keywords: action; agent; causation; Enç; event; foundationalism; naturalism; volition

Chapter.  15419 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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