Chapter

Deviance

Berent Enç

in How We Act

Published in print August 2003 | ISBN: 9780199256020
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602238 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199256020.003.0005
Deviance

Show Summary Details

Preview

Deals with the problem that a causal theory of action must be able to distinguish, in purely causal terms, between ‘deviant’ and ‘normal’ causal pathways. The objection goes as follows: there are clear intuitions that guide us in judging whether a behavioural output is an action or not. Since these intuitions cannot be explained in causal terms, they must be based on some non-causal conception of action. Hence, even if a causal account of action were true, it needs to be supplemented by something else. This chapter reviews the vast literature on this problem and offers a general and original solution to it.

Keywords: action; behaviour; causal theory of action; deviance; Enç

Chapter.  16379 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.