Chapter

Democracy as a Bayesian Persuader

Robert E. Goodin

in Reflective Democracy

Published in print February 2003 | ISBN: 9780199256174
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191599354 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199256179.003.0006

Series: Oxford Political Theory

Democracy as a Bayesian Persuader

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Shows how Bayesian thinking should make democratic outcomes so rationally compelling. Bayes's formula provides a mathematical expression for specifying exactly how we ought rationally to update our a priori beliefs in light of subsequent evidence, and the proposal is that voters are modelled in like fashion: votes, let us suppose, constitute (among other things) ‘reports’ of the voter's experiences and perceptions; further suppose that voters accord ‘evidentiary value’ to the reports they receive from one another through those votes; and further suppose that voters are rational, and that part and parcel of their being rational is being prepared to revise their opinions in light of further evidence (including evidence emanating from one another's votes‐cum‐reports). In this process, each of us treats our own experiences and perceptions as one source of evidence, and regards our own report as right; in that sense, we are perfectly sincere when we vote in a particular way, although we also acknowledge that our own experiences and perspectives are particular and peculiar, and hence our own perceptions are themselves inconclusive; because of that, voters striving to behave rationally should sincerely want to adjust their a priori beliefs in the light of all other experiences and perceptions that are reported at an election. Bayesian updating of that sort may well lead people who started out believing (and voting) one way to end up believing (and genuinely wanting implemented) the opposite way, just so long as sufficiently many votes‐cum‐reports point in that different direction; in other words, Bayesian reasoning can, and in politically typical cases ought to, provide people with a compelling reason to accede to the majority verdict. In this way, Bayesianism ‘rationalizes’ majority rule in a pretty strong sense; indeed if anything, it underwrites majoritarianism too strongly.

Keywords: Bayes's formula; Bayesian persuasion; Bayesian updating; Bayesianism; belief democracy; beliefs; democracy; majoritarianism; revision of opinion; voters; voters’ beliefs

Chapter.  6289 words. 

Subjects: Political Theory

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