Evidential Probability

Timothy Williamson

in Knowledge and its Limits

Published in print October 2002 | ISBN: 9780199256563
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598678 | DOI:
 Evidential Probability

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The chapter bases a theory of evidential probability on the equation of knowledge with evidence. It is a form of objective rather than subjective Bayesianism. Updating on new evidence is structured in a way that allows propositions to lose as well as gain probability (forgetting). The account is integrated with possible worlds models of epistemic logic. Since one does not always know what one knows, the accessibility relation is not an equivalence relation, which has the effect that prior probability can diverge from expected posterior probability.

Keywords: Bayesian; epistemic logic; evidential probability; forgetting; possible worlds; updating

Chapter.  14187 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Metaphysics

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