Truth and the Convergence of Opinion

Christopher Hookway

in Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Published in print December 2002 | ISBN: 9780199256587
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597718 | DOI:
Truth and the Convergence of Opinion

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This chapter is an extended discussion of Peirce's definition of truth as that on which inquiry is fated to converge. A detailed examination of how this thesis is to be formulated is followed by a discussion of the problem of ‘buried secrets’, of truths that are lost and will never be recovered. It is argued that pragmatist clarifications of concepts differ from other kinds of philosophical analyses, and that Peirce's account of truth is an account of the commitments we incur when we assert a proposition. It is also argued that the pragmatist clarification of truth is metaphysically neutral, leading neither to realism nor to anti‐realism.

Keywords: anti‐realism; assertion; convergence; inquiry; Peirce; pragmatist theory of truth; realism; truth

Chapter.  16697 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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