Chapter

Truth and Reference: Peirce Versus Royce

Christopher Hookway

in Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Published in print December 2002 | ISBN: 9780199256587
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597718 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199256586.003.0005
Truth and Reference: Peirce Versus Royce

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A discussion of a dispute between Royce and Peirce about truth and the possibility of false belief. Royce argued that only an absolute idealist can make sense of how we can refer to objects about which we have false beliefs. Peirce responded that this argument rested upon a flawed theory of reference: once we recognize that our primary kind of reference uses indexical signs, we can reconcile realism with the possibility of false belief. The chapter explores Peirce's account of indexical reference and its relation to his realism.

Keywords: absolute idealism; belief; false belief; indexical reference; Peirce; realism; reference; Royce; truth

Chapter.  12320 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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