Chapter

Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

Ralph Wedgwood

in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality

Published in print September 2003 | ISBN: 9780199257362
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601842 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199257361.003.0009
 Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

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Argues that internal requirements on rational choice are derived from the ultimate practical ‘aim’ of arriving at correct choices, which depend on which of one's options really are good things to do. In order to defend this ‘recognitional’ view of practical reason against the ‘constructivist’ who sees the internal, procedural requirements on rational choice as fundamental, the author argues that the objections which constructivists have raised against the recognitional view in fact apply only to substantive and not to formal versions of the latter. Furthermore, the author urges, objections of the very same kind can be pressed against the constructivist view itself.

Keywords: choice; constructivism; good; instrumental reasoning; Christine Korsgaard; practical reason; rationality; recognitional view

Chapter.  14503 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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