Chapter

Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory

Joseph Heath

in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality

Published in print September 2003 | ISBN: 9780199257362
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601842 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199257361.003.0011
 Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory

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Any theory of practical irrationality necessarily imposes a division of labour between an account of the agent's intentional states and how these are formed, and an account of how these intentional states get applied in particular circumstances to choose a particular action. Nevertheless, questions that concern the content of the agent's beliefs and desires are still routinely lumped together with questions that deal with the way the agent chooses in the light of these beliefs and desires. This generates a number of pseudoproblems. Seeks to clarify some of them, by considering the internal structure of decision theory.

Keywords: decision theory; deontic constraint; discounting; rule following; temptation; ultimatum game

Chapter.  9226 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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