Chapter

Pleonastic Propositions

Stephen Schiffer

in The Things We Mean

Published in print September 2003 | ISBN: 9780199257768
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602313 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199257760.003.0003
 Pleonastic Propositions

Show Summary Details

Preview

Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence is secured by something-from-nothing transformations, these being conceptually valid inferences that take one from a statement in which no reference is made to a thing of a certain kind to a statement—often a pleonastic equivalent of the first statement—in which there is a reference to a thing of that kind. The possibility of pleonastic entities is further explained in terms of the notion of one theory being a conservative extension of another. Propositions are pleonastic entities, and the way in which they are individuated shows how pleonastic propositions are both fine-grained and unstructured.

Keywords: conservative extension; fine-grained proposition; pleonastic entity; pleonastic proposition; proposition; something-from-nothing transformation; unstructured proposition

Chapter.  19895 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.