Chapter

Moral Realism and Indeterminacy

Stephen Schiffer

in The Things We Mean

Published in print September 2003 | ISBN: 9780199257768
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602313 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199257760.003.0007
 Moral Realism and Indeterminacy

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The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse conjoined with the theory of indeterminacy entail that moral realism is neither determinately true nor determinately false, that no substantive moral propositions have determinate truth values.

Keywords: cognitivism; indeterminacy; moral discourse; moral realism; normative discourse; pleonastic propositions

Chapter.  10905 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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