Chapter

The Subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals

Jonathan Bennett

in A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Published in print April 2003 | ISBN: 9780199258871
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597046 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199258872.003.0006
The Subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals

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Discussion of reasons for approaching indicative conditionals in terms of subjective rather than objective probability. The reasons include stand‐offs of the sort Gibbard has presented: cases where two right‐thinking people with partial information accept conflicting conditionals. Discussion and rejection of the view that subjectivity comes in because in asserting an indicative conditional one says that one has such and such a probability for the consequent given the antecedent. What remains, and seems to be right, is the view that in asserting such a conditional one is expressing a conditional probability without asserting anything.

Keywords: conditionals; Gibbard; indicative conditionals; objective probability; subjective probability

Chapter.  7424 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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