Chapter

Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability

Jonathan Bennett

in A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Published in print April 2003 | ISBN: 9780199258871
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597046 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199258872.003.0016
Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability

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By Lewis's account, it may be unduly hard for subjunctive conditionals to be outright true. We could weaken them by deeming each one to be true if its antecedent makes its consequent highly probable. Or we could follow Edgington's proposal that subjunctive conditionals should not be thought of in terms of truth at all but only of probability. It is shown here that adopting this proposal would not significantly narrow the chasm between subjunctives and indicatives.

Keywords: conditionals; Edgington; indicative conditionals; Lewis; probability; subjunctive conditionals; truth value

Chapter.  5736 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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