John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print May 2003 | ISBN: 9780199259748
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597657 | DOI:

Show Summary Details


An ontology that admits properties can treat properties as universals or particulars. Universals can be transcendent Platonic entities or in rebus: wholly present in each of their instances (and nowhere else). If properties are universals, similarity is reducible to identity: objects are similar by virtue of sharing constituents. This advantage is not enough to compensate for striking disadvantages, however.

Keywords: D. M. Armstrong; in rebus; mode; one‐over‐many; Plato; possible worlds; property; set; similarity; sparse; transcendent; trope; universal; way

Chapter.  4274 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.