Conscious Experience

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print May 2003 | ISBN: 9780199259748
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597657 | DOI:
 Conscious Experience

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Qualities of experiences are distinguished from qualities of objects experienced. Being in a state is distinguished from experiencing a state. The identity thesis (properties are powerful qualities) defended earlier is brought to bear on problems associated with conscious experiences; and an attempt is made to make sense of Jackson's Mary and the explanatory gap.

Keywords: access; consciousness; experience; explanatory gap; F. Jackson; Mary; privacy; qualia; quality; representation; representational medium; state

Chapter.  6745 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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