Chapter

Rationality and Disagreement

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism

Published in print June 2003 | ISBN: 9780199259755
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601835 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199259755.003.0010
Rationality and Disagreement

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Distinguishes two strands of the classic antirealist argument from moral disagreement. The first has it that the extent of actual disagreement provides the basis of an inference to best explanation to antirealism. The second claims that ideal observers would disagree about moral matters, and this justifies an antirealist verdict. The author Replies to these criticisms in a number of ways, but the one the author likes the most invokes an ethics‐philosophy parallel. Since intractable disagreement among wise, informed and rational people about philosophical matters does not license a verdict of philosophical antirealism, it should not do so when the subject is ethics proper.

Keywords: ideal observers; moral disagreement; philosophical antirealism

Chapter.  5992 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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