Chapter

Two Models of Belief

David Christensen

in Putting Logic in its Place

Published in print November 2004 | ISBN: 9780199263257
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602603 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199263256.003.0002
Two Models of Belief

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Ties the book's central question to a choice between a qualitative binary (all-or-nothing) conception of belief and a quantitative graded conception of belief (degrees of belief). The two conceptions invite different formal constraints. Argues that probabilistic coherence is best seen not as a new logic for graded belief, but as a way of applying standard logic to graded belief. Explores different ways of understanding the relation between binary and graded belief, concluding that the way one sees this relation has important implications for the questions of whether and how beliefs are subject to formal rationality constraints.

Keywords: binary belief; degrees of belief; formal constraints; graded belief; probabilistic coherence; qualitative belief

Chapter.  7607 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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