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This chapter focuses on Green's attack on the empiricist programme that sees all knowledge as resting on the deliverances of the senses. In this view, knowledge is built up from a foundation of simple discrete sensory experiences. He believes that this empiricist programme suffers rot at the foundations, because simple sensory experience that is not relational and in which the mind plays a purely passive role is impossible. For Green, it is hard to see how there could be any mere or pure sensation that was not at least implicitly relational and, hence, the product of the understanding.
Keywords: T. H. Green; knowledge; common sense; philosophical thought; sensory experience; empiricist programme
Chapter. 1368 words.
Subjects: History of Western Philosophy
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