David O. Brink

in Perfectionism and the Common Good

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780199266401
Published online April 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191600906 | DOI:

Series: Lines of Thought


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This chapter focuses on Green's non-naturalism, which commits him to his own dualism, inasmuch as he seems to think that a precondition of conscious experience is an active self-conscious mind that is prior to and independent of experience and so outside space and time. It is argued that Green's non-naturalism is problematic. His non-naturalism about the self threatens to reintroduce the very dualism for which he criticizes Kant. A related problem afflicts his view of the Absolute. Whereas the metaphysical and epistemological arguments of the first part of the Prolegomena seem to demand a single transcendent self-consciousness that is outside space and time, much of Green's ethics, political philosophy, and theology seems to treat the corporate spiritual principle as a transhistorical agent that is immanent in the lives of individual agents and progressive social institutions. Green must choose whether the Absolute is transcendent or immanent.

Keywords: non-naturalism; dualism; Kant; T. H. Green; dualism; the Absolute

Chapter.  510 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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