Chapter

DESIRE, INTELLECT, AND WILL <sup>9</sup>

David O. Brink

in Perfectionism and the Common Good

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780199266401
Published online April 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191600906 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199266409.003.0010

Series: Lines of Thought

DESIRE, INTELLECT, AND WILL 9

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This chapter focuses on Green's view that responsible action involves desire, intellect or belief, and will. Green argues that desire and belief are distinct, though complementary, mental states. They are, in a way, parallel — both involve a kind of ‘striving’ to overcome ‘alienation’ or ‘opposition’ with the world. Having explained the distinction and connections between belief and desire, the question arises whether the will can be reduced to either or is some third state, and what its role is in responsible action. Green believes that willing is distinct from both desire and from belief, and from the simple combination of belief and desire.

Keywords: T. H. Green; responsible action; belief; mental states

Chapter.  1095 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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