Chapter

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM AND THE GOOD

David O. Brink

in Perfectionism and the Common Good

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780199266401
Published online April 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191600906 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199266409.003.0012

Series: Lines of Thought

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM AND THE GOOD

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This chapter focuses on Good's views about the content of good will. Green rejects the hedonism that he finds in the utilitarian tradition and that he associates with a naturalistic approach to ethics. He focuses his criticism of hedonism on Mill's claims in Utilitarianism. One of Green's main complaints is that the plausibility of evaluative hedonism rests on a commitment (perhaps implicit) to psychological hedonism, which rests on the fallacy, which Butler exposed, of inferring that pleasure is the object of desire from the fact that it is expected that pleasure will attend the satisfaction of desire. Green' s Butlerian doubts about psychological hedonism are examined.

Keywords: T. H. Green; utilitarianism; Mill; Butler; psychological hedonism

Chapter.  808 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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