This chapter compares Green's claims about self-realization and the common good with Aristotle's claims about friendship and the way in which friendship contributes to the agent's own eudaimonia. This is an appropriate interpretative aid in so far as Green thinks that Aristotle was right to ground an agent's duties in an account of eudaimonia whose principal ingredient is a conception of practical virtue regulated by the common good, and Aristotle's account of the common good rests on his account of friendship.

This chapter compares Green's claims about self-realization and the common good with Aristotle's claims about friendship and the way in which friendship contributes to the agent's own eudaimonia. This is an appropriate interpretative aid in so far as Green thinks that Aristotle was right to ground an agent's duties in an account of eudaimonia whose principal ingredient is a conception of practical virtue regulated by the common good, and Aristotle's account of the common good rests on his account of friendship.