Paraworlds and Confirmation

Catherine Wilson

in Moral Animals

Published in print July 2004 | ISBN: 9780199267675
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601859 | DOI:
Paraworlds and Confirmation

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Addresses the question whether moral judgements can enjoy objectivity and whether posited moral rules can signify real obligations. It is argued that rules and judgements are interconvertible and, further, that a moral judgement reflects a hypothesis concerning a conduct rule of a fictional world. A brief examination of historical and contemporary examples of theoretical moral discourse reveals that moral theorists rely both on a reality constraint enforcing verisimilitude and an idealism characteristic in advancing prescriptive claims about how human beings ought to act. These observations provide the basis for a theory of confirmation for moral judgements that is independent of a commitment to moral realism and that is even consistent with some forms of relativism.

Keywords: confirmation; fictional worlds; moral judgement; moral realism; objectivity; obligation; relativism

Chapter.  13839 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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