Chapter

Pluralistic Realism

Mohan Matthen

in Seeing, Doing, and Knowing

Published in print February 2005 | ISBN: 9780199268504
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602283 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199268509.003.0009
Pluralistic Realism

Show Summary Details

Preview

A catalogue of mismatches between experienced colour and the physical counterparts of colour is presented. Does it show, as C. L. Hardin has argued, that colour is not real? No. It is proposed that a physically specifiable sense feature is real in the action-relative sense if there is some innate activity that would be disrupted by a failure of classification. This permits a plurality of idiosyncratic sensory classifications, while at the same time makes room for the idea that a sensory state might be wrong.

Keywords: C. L. Hardin; colour irrealism; David Lewis; Error Theory; opponent processing; physicalism; pluralism; realism; sensation; standards of correctness

Chapter.  10703 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.