Chapter

<b>Public Service Managerialism and Public Service Bargains: Control, Blame Avoidance, and Cheating</b>

Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge

in The Politics of Public Service Bargains

Published in print June 2006 | ISBN: 9780199269679
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191604096 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019926967X.003.0009
 Public Service Managerialism and Public Service Bargains: Control, Blame Avoidance, and Cheating

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This chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means for public service bargains and points to the demanding conditions of such a bargain, given the incentives to cheat that affect the various parties to this type of bargain. Given its vulnerability to cheating, the managerialist type of bargain seems likely to emerge and ‘stick’ only in some traditions and cultures.

Keywords: NPM; managerialism; agency; control; cheating; blame; homeostatic control; thermostat

Chapter.  7583 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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