Chapter

Can Holism be True?

Jonathan Dancy

in Ethics Without Principles

Published in print June 2004 | ISBN: 9780199270026
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601729 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199270023.003.0006
Can Holism be True?

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Considers various attempts to show that holism in the theory of reasons must be false. Distinguishes various forms of atomism, considers various appeals to notions of complete reasons and full explanations, asks whether moral reasoning is a form of inference and whether conceptual competence requires the existence of natural patterns, and ends by asking whether a particularist can allow that some moral considerations have a default relevance.

Keywords: atomism; complete reasons; default reasons; inference; patterns

Chapter.  13157 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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