Chapter

Knowing Reasons

Jonathan Dancy

in Ethics Without Principles

Published in print June 2004 | ISBN: 9780199270026
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601729 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199270023.003.0008
Knowing Reasons

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A chapter on moral epistemology. Asks what, for the particularist, will count as a basic moral fact. Considers the modal status of such facts, arguing that they are contingent, but known a priori. Claims that this position is neither foundationalist nor coherentist. Ends by considering various suggestions that particularism cannot avoid some form of general scepticism in ethics.

Keywords: a priori knowledge; basic moral facts; coherentism; contingency modality; epistemology; foundationalism; moral scepticism

Chapter.  11770 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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