C. J. Misak

in Truth and the End of Inquiry

Published in print March 2004 | ISBN: 9780199270590
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603174 | DOI:

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs


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This chapter argues that Peirce did not want to disqualify certain important kinds of pragmatism from the category of the legitimate. He provided the resources for a plausible, if not precise, moderate empiricist criterion of legitimacy. Once articulated, it can be employed in constructing an account of truth. Peirce’s construct of truth is not an analytic definition of truth, but a distinctively pragmatic elucidation of truth. It is an account of the relationship between truth and inquiry.

Keywords: Peirce; truth; pragmatism; empiricism; linguistic competence

Chapter.  16703 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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