Chapter

Objectivity, Bivalence, and Truth

C. J. Misak

in Truth and the End of Inquiry

Published in print March 2004 | ISBN: 9780199270590
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603174 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199270597.003.0005

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Objectivity, Bivalence, and Truth

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This chapter explores the I-T conditional, and shows how it preserves four other well-understood senses of objectivity. Peirce believes that both T-I and the principle of bivalence have an unusual status, arguing that these are regulative assumptions of inquiry. If one hopes or assumes that H is true, then one would arrive at H, if inquiry were to be prolonged as far as it could go. It is shown that the contemplation of the possibility that some hypotheses may escape this hope does not endanger what is worth preserving in Peirce’s account; it does not endanger the relationship he has seen between truth and inquiry.

Keywords: Peirce; truth; objectivity; inquiry; pragmatism

Chapter.  17501 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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