Chapter

Entitlement, Truth, and Content

Christopher Peacocke

in The Realm of Reason

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780199270729
Published online April 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191600944 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199270724.003.0002
Entitlement, Truth, and Content

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States and defends the first principle of rationalism, The Special Truth‐Conduciveness Thesis, which illustrates the connection between entitlement to form a given belief and the belief's truth. The principle holds that a fundamental and irreducible part of what makes a transition one to which a thinker is entitled is that the transition tends to lead to true judgements in a distinctive way characteristic of rational transitions. The author then defends this principle and its commitments against a variety of challenges, notably against two extreme views on the role the notion of evidence plays in the individuation of concepts and meanings. On one view evidence has no part at all to play in the individuation of concepts, and on the other, Quinean, view meanings are not merely partially, but exclusively a matter of certain evidential relations. The author challenges both views and suggests a middle way which his Generalised Rationalism is able to tread.

Keywords: belief; concept; entitlement; evidence; individuation; judgement; meaning; rationalism; transition; Truth; Truth‐Conduciveness

Chapter.  18504 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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