Chapter

Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area

Charles M. Kahn and João A. C. Santos

in Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs

Published in print March 2004 | ISBN: 9780199271405
Published online August 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191601200 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199271402.003.0017
 Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area

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The Maastricht Treaty created the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (ECB) to head the system. The treaty entrusts the ECB with the responsibility for monetary policy, but national authorities remain responsible for financial stability. In this chapter, we focus on the implications of national versus central assignment of lender-of-last-resort and supervisory functions for the degree of forbearance in closing distressed banks and for the level of diligence in bank supervision. One major conclusion is that, if only one of the two functions is centralized, then it will be more effective to centralize the supervisory function.

Keywords: Lender of last resort; banking supervision; assignment problem; incentive compatibility; European System of Central Banks; European Central Bank; Maastricht Treaty; regulatory theory; incentive compatibility

Chapter.  6654 words. 

Subjects: Economic Systems

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