Chapter

The Objectivity of Moral Judgements

G. E. Moore

in Ethics

Published in print August 2005 | ISBN: 9780199272013
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603181 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199272018.003.0003

Series: British Moral Philosophers

 The Objectivity of Moral Judgements

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Moore maintains that, in principle, there is an objective answer to questions of right and wrong. More specifically, that a particular action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time or at different times. In this chapter and the next, Moore argues against theories that deny this latter proposition and thus reject the objectivity of moral judgments. Beginning with a critique of the thesis that when one asserts that an action is right or wrong, one is merely asserting that one has a certain feeling towards it, this chapter focuses its critical fire on various attitudinal theories of ethics.

Keywords: class of actions; differ in opinion; knowledge; maximum of pleasure; mental attitude; moral approval; nature of ethics; voluntary action

Chapter.  11314 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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