Chapter

The Objectivity of Moral Judgements (<i>concluded</i>)

G. E. Moore

in Ethics

Published in print August 2005 | ISBN: 9780199272013
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603181 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199272018.003.0004

Series: British Moral Philosophers

 The Objectivity of Moral Judgements (concluded)

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This chapter continues Moore’s critique of different attitudinal theories of ethics begun in the previous chapter. He discusses theories that view moral judgements as judgements about the will (rather than the feelings) of some being or beings, focusing on the theory that the wrongness of what is wrong consists simply in the fact that God forbids it. Moore then turns to theories that see mental attitudes as determining, not what is right and wrong, but rather what is good and bad.

Keywords: classes of action; commands; desired for its own sake; God; intrinsically better; mankind; mental attitude; total effects; right

Chapter.  7811 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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