Intrinsic Value

G. E. Moore

in Ethics

Published in print August 2005 | ISBN: 9780199272013
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603181 | DOI:

Series: British Moral Philosophers

 Intrinsic Value

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  • History of Western Philosophy


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In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the greatest intrinsic value. He criticizes the hedonistic doctrine that one whole is intrinsically better than another when, and only when, it contains more pleasure. He rejects not only the idea that intrinsic value is proportional to pleasure, but also that it is proportional to any other single factor. He concludes by distinguishing different senses in which a thing can be good or bad.

Keywords: criterion of right; egoism; good effects; intrinsically better; intrinsically good; quantity of pleasure; subjective predicates; total consequences; value of a whole

Chapter.  6100 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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